Ownership Rights and Investment in Agricultural Land in Ghana: A Gender Analysis by Aikins, E. R. et al.
Ownership Rights and Investment in Agricultural Land in Ghana: A Gender 
Analysis
E. R. Aikins, A. D. Oduro and D. K. Twerefou* 
Department of Economics, University of Ghana, Legon, Accra, Ghana  
*Corresponding Author: twerefou@yahoo.co.uk/dktwerefou@ug.edu.gh
Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between ownership rights and investment in agricultural land from a 
gender perspective in Ghana, using the Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood estimation technique 
and data from the Ghana Household Asset Survey. The results indicate that investment in agricultural lands is 
generally low in Ghana and tends to occur mostly in agricultural lands owned by men suggesting its inability 
to enhance tenure security. Furthermore, investment in agricultural lands owned by men is associated with 
a wider range of ownership rights.  However, the same cannot be said about agricultural land owned by 
women as investments in their land do not significantly improve their rights to the land. Except for economic 
rights that appear to have a significant negative association with investments in agricultural lands owned by 
women, all other rights have no significant relationship with investments in agricultural lands owned by both 
men and women. There is a positive relationship between age and ownership rights for men suggesting that 
the youth may have challenges securing their tenure. We recommend the strengthening of the current land 
administration projects to enhance tenure security. Policies that will support the growing of perennial trees, 
construction of farmhouses and irrigation should be put in place by the government to encourage men to 
undertake such investments as they tend to improve ownership rights of agricultural lands. More should also 
be done to secure the ownership rights of the youth if the government wants them to engage in agriculture.    
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Introduction
Ownership relates to the rights a person has 
over an object. Honore (1961) identified 
eleven rights that can describe the relationship 
between a person and an object. These are the 
right to possess, right to use, right to manage, 
right to income, right to the capital, right to 
security, right to transmissibility, absence of 
term, liability to execution, residuary character 
and prohibition of harmful use. A person’s 
relationship with an object may be defined 
by some or all eleven rights to ownership 
proposed by Honore (1961). This then raises 
the question of which bundle of rights defines 
an owner. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) provide 
a framework to answer this question by 
proposing four categories of rights - the right 
to access and withdraw, the right to manage, 
the right to exclude and the right to alienate, 
and four categories of persons in relation to 
these rights -the authorized user who only has 
the right to access and withdraw, a claimant 
who has management rights together with 
access and withdrawal rights, a proprietor has 
all rights apart from alienation rights and the 
owner who has all the four rights.
The bundle of ownership rights one has to an 
asset such as agricultural land determines the 
incentive to invest in that asset. Three main 
theoretical arguments have been advanced in 
favour of the relationship between property 
rights and investment (Brasselle et. al, 2002). 
These are the assurance effect which argues 
that farmers are motivated to undertake long-
term investment when rights are secured and 
they are certain of the returns; The realizability 
effect argument which argues that farmers 
will be willing to invest in the land when they 
have transfer rights that provide them with the 
option to convert the land into a liquid asset 
through rent or sale (Besley, 1995; Platteau, 
1996) and the collateralization effect which 
argues that land can be used as collateral to 
secure credit for agricultural investment if the 
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owner has such rights. 
There is inconclusive empirical evidence 
on the relationship between land ownership 
rights and investment. This is largely because 
both land rights and investment have not been 
measured consistently across studies and 
different methodological approaches have 
been adopted. As posited by Fenske (2010) 
the nature of investment, methodology, 
sample size and the measurement of the land 
right variables have a significant effect in 
determining the nature of the relationship. 
The most widely used indicator of ownership 
rights is formal titles that ensure tenure 
security (Brasselle et al., 2002). Besley (1995) 
demonstrated the possibility of endogeneity 
between investment and rights because when 
lands have been developed, owners will take 
measures to protect their investment and 
secure their rights on such lands.  Brasselle 
et al., (2002) noted that regardless of whether 
rights are supported by legal titles or enforced 
informally, the problem of causality still exists. 
In the case where property rights are supported 
by legal titles, farmers tend to register lands 
that potentially can yield a high level of return 
(Roth et al., 1994). This is because farmers 
will only bear the cost of registration when 
they are certain the land can yield such an 
amount in return. On the other hand, in cases 
where rights are not formalized, land rights 
may depend on past investment (Brasselle et 
al., 2002).
Early studies that examined the relationship 
between land rights and investment such as 
Place and Hazell (1993) and Harrison’s (1992) 
did not control for endogeneity. However, 
studies such as Besley (1995), Brasselle et al. 
(2002) and Ayamga and Dzanku (2013) have 
addressed the causality problem by modelling 
rights as an endogenous variable. Besley 
(1995), using the same dataset as Migot-
Adholla et.al. (1991) modelled rights as an 
endogenous variable such that farmer’s rights 
on the land are influenced by their previous 
investment. His results contradicted those 
of Mighot-Adholla et al. (1991). In Besley’s 
(1995) study, the different rights an owner 
had on a plot of land were summed to obtain 
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a continuous variable thereby allowing him 
to employ the Instrumental Variable (IV) 
approach to deal with endogeneity. 
However, this approach was criticized by 
Plattaeu (1996) because simply adding up 
rights and attaching equal weights to each 
right implicitly assumes that ordinal variables 
can be treated as metric variables and the 
IV approach comes at the cost of impairing 
the efficiency of the estimators leading to 
biased estimators.  With this criticism in 
mind, Brasselle et. al., (2002) measured 
rights as ordered categorical variables based 
on a hierarchy of rights. They employed the 
Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood 
Method (2SCML) originally developed 
by Rivers and Voung (1988) to control for 
endogeneity. This method is suitable because 
land rights are measured more rationally, 
and the econometric technique is appropriate 
(Platteau, 1996). Brasselle et al. (2002) obtained 
a positive association between investment and 
security of tenure of farmers, however, after 
controlling for endogeneity, improved land 
rights did not enhance investments. 
Abdulai et al (2011) adopted a similar 
approach and found that differences in land 
tenure security have a positive and significant 
influence on investment decisions of farmers 
in land improvement while Twerefou et al. 
(2011), following the approach by Brasselle et 
al. (2002), concluded that tenure security has 
a significant positive impact on investment; 
however, investment in farmlands have no 
influence on tenure security. Meanwhile, 
Bambio and Agha (2018) concluded for rural 
Burkina Faso that land rights enhance land-
related investment whilst investment in land 
has a direct impact on strong land rights. 
In a more recent study, Vu and Goto (2020) 
established for rural households in Vietnam 
that awareness about the increase in the 
duration of agricultural land-use rights leads 
to an increment in agricultural investments 
particularly an increase in the use of irrigation 
or soil conservation and the adoption of organic 
fertilizer. Likewise, Suchá et. al., (2020) 
confirmed that greater land tenure security has 
a significant positive effect on investments in 
urban agriculture in South Africa. 
The differences in the results on the relationship 
between rights and investment can partly be 
attributed to the different conceptualisation 
of investment in the literature. Whilst many 
of the studies define agriculture investment to 
mean any improvement on the land, the nature 
of improvement has differed from one study to 
the other. For instance, Brasselle et.al. (2002) 
provided five different forms of investment 
on land while Twerefou et. al., (2011) 
defines investment to include equipment or 
technology such as machines and tractors used 
to develop the land. Other forms of investment 
include irrigation, building of farmhouses, 
construction of roads and storage, bullock 
plough, among others. Other studies have also 
categorized investment in agricultural land 
into short, medium and long term (Dube and 
Guveya, 2013). 
In terms of the gender dimension, there is a 
dearth of studies that compare the relationship 
between rights and investment of women and 
men farmers. One study that has a gender 
dimension is that of Goldstein and Udry (2008) 
who examined the effect of contested land 
rights on investment in Ghana. They concluded 
that women are seldom in influential positions 
in society to have improved rights to land and 
likely to invest less on their plots. In Haiti, 
Deaton et al., (2016) concluded that variations 
in tenure security by the sex of plot owners 
have a significant influence on investment 
decisions. As such women are reluctant to 
undertake investment on their inherited lands 
which they have weak rights. In a related 
study, Ali et al., (2014) demonstrated that land 
tenure security through land registration leads 
to increase investment in land by women in 
Rwanda.
The Food and Agricultural Organization 
(2011) argues that women in developing 
countries are likely to have weak land rights 
while Goldstein and Udry (2008) conclude 
that in Ghana, women’s rights differ by their 
social status which affects investment. Oduro 
et al., (2011) also showed that land rights differ 
by gender. In Uganda, women have problems 
maintaining some rights to land after the death 
of their husband or after divorce (Deininger and 
Castagnini, 2006). Bambio and Agha (2018) 
also established that women are more likely 
to have weaker land rights than men. These 
pieces of evidence suggest that women do not 
have the same land rights as men. Some socio-
cultural practices prohibit and/or discourage 
women from having particular rights to land 
and other assets (Hughes et al., 2011). If rights 
determine the incentive to invest and women 
and men do not have the same bundle of rights, 
it will be expected ceteris paribus, that the 
likelihood of investment in agricultural lands 
will differ between women and men. 
A notable gap in the literature is that none 
of these studies has paid attention to gender 
differences in the distribution of the bundle 
of rights to land and how these differences 
may influence the investment decisions of 
women and men farmers in Ghana. The few 
studies that have examined issues of gender 
have done so by including a gender dummy. 
This study goes a step further by estimating 
separate models for women and men to analyze 
the relationship between land rights and 
agricultural investment for women and men. 
As noted by Singirankabo and Ertsen (2020), 
there is a need for more research to better 
understand and appreciate the relationship 
between land tenure security and agricultural-
related investment and productivity.
This paper therefore seeks to investigate 
the implication of different land rights on 
investment in land by women and men in 
Ghana. Specifically, the paper examines the 
relationship between access and withdrawal 
rights, management rights, economic rights 
and alienation rights on investment in 
agricultural lands owned by women and men 
in Ghana. 
Analysis of these issues is important because 
even though land is abundant in Africa 
(Kariuki, 2011) there has been inadequate 
investment in land because of insecurity of 
tenure (Twerefou, et al., 2011). An assessment 
of the causal relationship between ownership 
rights and investment, especially from a 
gender perspective, will enable the design 
of policy measures to increase investment in 
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land by women and men landowners. This has 
the potential to address the poverty trap that 
many Africans find themselves (Chauvin et 
al., 2012). 
Materials and Methods  
Model Specification
Following the approach adopted by Besley 
(1995), Brasselle et al. (2002) and Twerefou et 
al. (2011) in modelling the causal relationship 
between rights and investment, the following 
system of equations are specified:
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efficient, and therefore reduces the problem 
of incorrect standard errors compared to the 
IVP approach (Birungi and Hasan, 2007). 
The 2SCML is an inbuilt endogeneity test in 
that, if the residuals of the first stage equation 
are not statistically significant as a predictor, 
then there is no simultaneous equation bias 
or endogeneity (Chard, 2004). However, 
evidence from Monte Carlo experiments 
indicates that even in cases where these 
conditions are not met, the 2SCML is a more 
efficient estimator compared to other classes 
of simultaneous equation models (Alvarez 
and Glasgow, 1999).  
The effect of investment on rights is 
investigated using the Ordered Probit 
Model (OPM). To test for endogeneity of 
the investment function, the first stage is to 
estimate the reduced form of the investment 
equation (1) labelled as (3) which consists of 
exogenous independent variables. As noted by 
Brasselle et.al (2002), equation (3) is a linear 
probability model and the investment variable 
is not instrumented as with the Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS). In the second stage, 
the estimated residuals in equation (3), ȗ,  are 
included as an independent variable in the 
second stage equation for the ownership rights 
equation (4) which corresponds to an Ordered 
Probit model.
Where I is investment, R is ownership rights, 
W and Z are distinct vectors of exogenous 
variables, μ and ν represents the residuals in 
the investment and ownership right equations 
respectively, α and δ are the constants and β, γ, 
λ and η are the coefficients.
Estimation Technique
Given the possibility of reverse causality 
between ownership rights and investment, 
it is important to test for endogeneity bias. 
The issue of endogeneity arises because, 
whereas improvement in rights enhances 
investment, the converse is also true. This is 
because, for lands that have been developed, 
owners will take measures to protect their 
investment and secure their rights on such 
lands. The conventional method of testing 
for endogeneity using the Two-Stage Least 
Square (2SLS) method is not valid when the 
dependent variable is binary (Brasselle et 
al. 2002). We therefore use the Two-Stage 
Conditional Maximum Likelihood method 
(2SCML) originally developed by Rivers and 
Voung (1988) and adopted by Brasselle et al. 
(2002) and Twerefou et al. (2011). 
This method is more appropriate than the 
Instrumental Variable Probit (IVP) approach 
because the estimates obtained using this 
approach are consistent and asymptotically 
The coefficient of the generated residuals (ρ) 
in equation (4) is used to determine whether 
there is simultaneous equation bias or not. 
With a null hypothesis of exogeneity, if ρ is 
significantly different from zero then the null 
hypothesis can be rejected, and we conclude 
that there is simultaneous equation bias. 
However, if ρ is not significantly different 
from zero then the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected and suggesting there is no 
simultaneous equation bias. 
A similar procedure is used to investigate the 
effect of rights on investment. The reduced 
form of equation (2) is estimated and the 
residuals generated from these equations are 
inserted as an explanatory variable in equation 
(1). However, since rights were captured as an 
ordered variable with four categories, there 
will be three endogenous dummy variables 
in the investment equation (Brasselle, et al. 
2002) since the first category is used as the 
reference dummy. For each of these categories, 
a reduced form was estimated. The residuals 
generated from the reduced form equations 
were used to test for the endogeneity bias for 
each category of ownership right. The reduced 
form of equation (2) is specified as equation 
(5) and the investment function with the 
generated residuals is accordingly specified as 
equation (6).
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Where f = female and m = male 
Data and variable description
The data for the analysis was obtained from 
the Ghana Household Asset Survey (GHAS) 
that was carried out from May to July 2010 
by the University of Ghana, Department of 
Economics. A two-stage sampling procedure 
was employed. In the first stage, enumeration 
areas were selected from each of Ghana’s 
ten administrative regions. The number of 
enumeration areas selected was determined by 
each region’s share of the total population. In 
the second stage, 15 households were randomly 
selected from each of the enumeration areas. 
In all, a total of 2,170 households covering 
all ten regions of Ghana were surveyed. The 
questionnaire had four main sections. The 
first section collected information on the 
demographic characteristics of household 
members. The second section collected data on 
household physical assets (agricultural land, 
place of residence, real estate, agricultural 
equipment, livestock, consumer durables 
and businesses) and their owners. The third 
section collected data on consumption 
expenditure of the household and the last 
section collected more detailed information 
on asset ownership. In addition, this section 
also collected information on financial assets 
owned by respondents, rights over assets and 
any income they generate. In total, the data 
consist of 7,984 observations from 2,170 
households. An observation here is considered 
as a plot signifying that households on average 
have more than three plots. 
This paper focuses on observations with 
agricultural land in examining the relationship 
between ownership rights and investment. 
Out of the total of 7,984 observations in the 
2010 GHAS, only 825 of them are owners 
of agricultural lands, owning 1410 plots. 
This implies that some landowners had more 
than one plot.  About 73.1 percent of the plot 
were owned by men while the remaining 26.9 
percent were owned by women. The unit of 
analysis for this paper is the plot owned by 
individuals and not the individuals themselves.
The coefficient of the generated residuals 
(ɸ) is used in testing for the exogeneity of 
each category of the rights variable with 
a null hypothesis of exogeneity of these 
categories. The significance or otherwise of 
the coefficients of these residuals (ɸi) is used 
in determining whether there is endogeneity 
of each category of land rights (Brasselle et al. 
2002). Also, in testing for the endogeneity of 
property rights, a joint Wald test is conducted 
on the vector (ɸi). The test criteria are the 
same as stated above. To consider the gender 
dimension of the relationship between each of 
these rights and investment, equations (4) and 
(6) were estimated differently for agricultural 
land owned by women and agricultural land 
owned by men as specified below:
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Table 1 presents the characteristics of 
agricultural landowners. Analysis of the 
responses suggests that over 73 % of the 
respondents are men indicating that more 
men own agricultural land than women. Most 
men who own agricultural lands are currently 
married (over 86%) whilst most women who 
own agricultural land are either currently 
married (46.8%) or previously married 
(52.2%). Almost all agricultural landowners 
have either never been to school or have 9 
years of basic education. Both women and men 
landowners are predominantly self-employed 
without employees with the proportion of men 
slightly higher than women.
The mean age is 51 years for men and 54 years 
for women. Majority of both women and men 
agricultural landowners are in the rural areas 
however the proportion of men landowners 
in the rural areas is slightly higher than that 
of women. The predominant crops grown 
among men and women are annual crops 
with the proportion of men who grow annual 
crops a little higher than that of women. 
More than half of the respondents belong to 
an organization. However, the proportion 
of women who belong to an organization 
is more than men. The average wealth for 
men and women was (GHC) 20,584.4 and 
GHC11,423.8 respectively. 
TABLE 1
Characteristics of Landowners (percent)
Variables Total Men Women 
Marital status 
Never Married 2.9 3.6 1.2
Currently Married 74.6 86.4 47.7
Previously Married 22.5 10 51.1
Location 
Urban 17.5 13.2 27.2
Rural 82.5 86.8 72.8
Education 
Never been to school 38.5 37.3 41.4
Basic education 51.7 51.3 52.6
Secondary education 6.5 7.6 4.1
Tertiary education 3.3 3.8 1.9
Employment 
Wage employment-public 3.7 4.1 2.5
Wage employment-private 2.9 3.3 1.6
Self-employment with employees 6.2 6.0 5.7
Self-employment without employees 86.2 86.2 86.3
Others 1 0.4 3.9
Mean Age 51.9 51.3 54
Social networks 
Belong to organization 54.6 49.9 65.3
Does not belong to an organization 45.4 50.1 34.7
Crops Grown 
Annual Crops 67.2 68.6 64
Tree Crops 32.8 31.4 36
Average Wealth GHC18,208.1 GHC20,584.4 GHC11,423.8
Source: Ghana Household Asset Survey, 2010. NB: The values should add up to 100% for every variable with 
categories vertically
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Results and Discussions 
Ownership Rights and Investment 
The existed practice in Ghana was that the 
first person to clear a prime forest can claim 
ownership of the land. With the decline in prime 
forest, the mode of acquiring agricultural land 
is largely through inheritance, gifts, purchase 
and by virtue of being a member of a family 
or community (Table 2). The main mode of 
acquiring agricultural lands in Ghana among 
men and women is through inheritance. Over 
49 per cent of the plots owned by both women 
and men were acquired through inheritance. 
There are gender disparities in the acquisition 
of land through gifts and by virtue of being a 
member of a lineage.  Men own more family 
land than women  (Table 2).  The other modes 
of acquisition was mainly land obtained 
through adjudication. 
More men than women acquire agricultural 
land through family lineage as indicated in 
Table 2.  This, to an extent, is consistent with 
customary laws in Ghana where men are more 
likely to be heirs of family properties compared 
to women. As noted by Hughes et al., (2011) 
in both the patrilineal and matrilineal systems 
in Ghana, family lands are considered to 
belong to the lineage through the male family 
heads. Among matrilineal ethnic groups, 
fathers, and husbands usually gift land to their 
children and wives in compensation for their 
labour services (Duncan 2010). Gifting occurs 
especially because female children and wives 
are not expected to inherit the property of their 
fathers and husbands. This is a way for fathers 
and husbands to get around this customary 
practice (Amanor 2001, Boni 2008).
Ownership Rights 
The study uses six main types of ownership 
rights as captured in 2010 GHAS data: These 
are the right to make decisions about the type 
of crops to grow on the land, the right to decide 
what to produce on the land, the right to decide 
how much of the produce is sold, the right to 
decide how revenue from the sale of crops is 
used, the right to use the land as collateral and 
the right to sell the land. Respondents were 
asked whether they could exercise these rights 
alone or in consultation with others. Each of 
these rights was captured as a discrete variable 
with a value one (1) if the person can exercise 
such a right on his or her plot (either alone or 
in consultation) and zero (0) if otherwise. 
Since we captured ownership rights as a 
categorical variable in hierarchical form, 





Purchased plots 9.3 8.2 0.654
Inherited plots 49.5 49.8 0.416
Gifted plots 10.0 27.1 0.000
Family plots1 20.6 10.8 0.000
Other 10.6 4.1 0.004
Investment
Plots that have been improved 34.2 25.0 0.001
Plots that have not been improved 65.8 75.0 0.001
Category of Rights
Plots with owners having access and withdrawal rights 1.1 8.5 0.000
Plots with owners having management rights 49.8 56.2 0.047
Plots with owners having economic rights 13.2 5.1 0.000
Plots with owners having alienation rights 35.9 30.2 0.062
Source: Ghana Household Asset Survey, 2010. NB: The values should add up to 100% for every variable with 
categories vertically
1 For the purposes of this discussion, family plots are plots that belongs to the entire extended family which is available for use by the 
respondents. On the other hand, inherited plots are plots that have been bequeathed to the respondents as inheritance from any member 
of the family.
variables. We adopt the classification of rights 
developed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
to reclassify the six rights in hierarchical 
order as presented in Appendix 1. At the top 
of the hierarchy is the right to sell followed 
by economic, management and access and 
withdrawal rights.
There are significant differences in the pattern 
of ownership rights of plots owned by women 
and men. About 8.5 per cent of plots owned 
by women have owners with access and 
withdrawal rights compared to 1.1 per cent 
of plots owned by men. The proportion of 
plots owned by women with management 
rights (56.2%) is higher than the proportion 
of plots owned by men (49.8%). Plots owned 
by men are more likely to have owners with 
economic rights (13.2%) and sales rights 
(35.9%) compared to plots owned by women 
(5.1% and 30.2% respectively). These findings 
confirm the report by Food and Agriculture 
Organization (2011) that women in developing 
countries are more likely to have weaker land 
rights. The description of the exogenous 
variables is provided as appendix 2.
Investment Variable
Each respondent was asked whether they 
had made any improvements on the plot in 
the last five years. The study captures the 
investment variable as a dummy with a value 
of one (1) if any improvements had been made 
on the plot in the last five years and zero (0) 
otherwise. Investment in land is generally low 
although the proportion of improved plots 
owned by men is higher than improved plots 
owned by women. Specifically, investment 
was undertaken on about 34 per cent of the 
plots owned by men compared to 24 per cent 
of women’s plots. Twerefou et al., (2011) 
also found a low incidence of investment in 
agricultural plots.
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TABLE 3
Ownership Rights Equation




Marital status -0.788**(0.369) -0.800***(0.244)
Educational status 0.0642(0.151) 0.272(0.217)
Economic status -0.655(0.593) 0.970***(0.369)
Mode of acquisition (ref : family land)
Inherited land 0.652***(0.166) 0.643**(0.263)
 Gifted land 0.631***(0.204) 1.088***(0.258)
Purchased land 1.023***(0.255) 0.556(0.349)
Residual -6.398*(3.350) -1.314(1.151)
Constant cut1 -0.334(0.992) 0.232(0.803)
Constant cut2 3.141***(0.946) 2.341***(0.812)
Constant cut3 3.474***(0.942) 2.481***(0.812)
Pseudo R2 0.0649 0.1124
Wald χ2 56.94 39.51
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 772 307
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computation using GHAS data
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Ownership Rights Equation
Identifying the relationship between 
ownership rights and investment for women 
and men landowners began by running reduced 
form investment equations. The residuals 
obtained from these first-stage regressions 
were included in the ordered probit regression 
models on ownership rights. Table 3 presents 
results from the regression models for women 
and men respectively. Investment in lands is 
associated with an improvement in the rights 
of plots owned by men only.  
We find it difficult to discuss this result with 
previous studies since such studies did not 
estimate separate regression for men and 
women. However, there are previous studies 
that are worth mentioning. For instance, 
Twerefou et al. (2011) established that 
investment in farmland does not have any 
significant influence on the security of tenure 
of farmers. Also, a recent finding in Ghana 
by Ayamga et al. (2015) and an earlier study 
in Burkina Faso by Brasselle et al. (2002) 
concluded that investment in agricultural 
lands enhances tenure security. The coefficient 
of the generated residuals in the first stage 
investment equation for plots owned by men 
is statistically significant whilst that of plots 
owned by women is not significant.
For both men and women, owners of plots 
acquired through gift and inheritance were 
more likely to have better rights to their plots 
compared to plots that are family lands. This is 
expected since family lands belong to the entire 
extended family and decisions concerning the 
land must be taken collectively by the family 
and therefore owners are less likely to receive 
permission to exercise the appropriate rights. 
This is consistent with the findings of Twerefou 
et al. (2011) that gifted plots are more secured 
than plots acquired through a lease. Men 
who acquired their plots through purchase 
were more likely to have better rights to their 
plots compared to plots that are family lands. 
However, plots acquired through purchase 
by women did not significantly increase the 
likelihood of increasing their rights compared 
to family land. This may be that such plots 
were purchased using the husband’s resources.
For plots owned by men, there is a positive 
relationship between rights and the age of the 
owner. This means that men plot owners are 
more likely to have better rights on their plot 
as they get older which is in accordance with 
customs and traditions since older people are 
accorded much respect and they are the ones in 
influential positions and opinion leaders.  This 
supports the findings of Ayamga et al. (2015) 
that younger people face insecure tenure as 
compared to older people. It also enforces the 
assertion by Goldstein and Udry (2008) that 
influential people and opinion leaders have 
more secure tenure. However, no significant 
relation was observed between rights and the 
age of the owner for plots owned by women. 
Both men and women who are not married are 
more likely to have improved rights over their 
plots compared to those who are currently 
married. The reason could be that married 
people are less likely to receive permission or 
approval from their spouse to exercise such 
right (Oduro et. al., 2011). For plots owned by 
women, owners who are engaged in economic 
activities are more likely to have stronger rights 
compared to those who are not engaged in any 
economic activities. This result is expected as 
women with higher economic status can better 
protect their rights since they can afford legal 
service to secure their ownership. As expected, 
plots that are owned alone are likely to have 
owners with better rights compared to those 
owned jointly. This result is true for plots 
owned by both women and men and expected 
since joint ownership requires consultation 
before decisions are made.
Investment Equation
Table 4 presents the results for the effect of 
ownership rights on investment. As evident 
from Table 4, none of the coefficients of the 
rights variables in the men’s regression model 
is significant suggesting that ownership rights 
are not significantly related to investments 
made on the plots. This result is consistent 
with the recent finding in Ghana by Ayamga 
et al. (2015) and an earlier study in Burkina 
Faso by Brasselle et al., (2002) that improved 
rights over land do not significantly influence 
investment. Recent studies such as Ayamga 
and Dzanku (2013) have also expressed doubts 
about the existence of an effect of land tenure 
security on investment. However, Twerefou 
et. al (2011) came to the opposite conclusion.
In contrast to the men’s regression model, there 
is a significant relationship between rights and 
investment in the model for women-owned 
plots. The coefficient of the economic rights 
variable is negative and significant suggesting 
that women owners with economic rights are 
less likely to improve these plots compared 
to women owners who only have withdrawal 
and user rights over their plots. This negative 
relationship could be attributed to the fact that 
women who own plots improve their plots to 
secure their lands as with usufruct title. The 
coefficients of the residuals generated from the 
first stage equation of all the three categories 
of ownership rights are not statistically 
significant for both the men and women 
sample except residual three for the female 
sample. Moreover, a joint Wald test on these 
coefficients is also not statistically significant 
from zero in both cases. 
For the men’s sample, plots whose owners 
are currently married are more likely to be 
improved than those whose owners are not 
married. However, no significant relation 
was found for plots owned by women. This 
perhaps could be attributed to the fact that 
men invest in the land so they could leave it 
as an inheritance for the family. This is not 
surprising as it is consistent with customary 
laws in Ghana where men are the heads of the 
households and are responsible for the family. 
For plots owned by women, those who have 
attained some years of formal education are 
less likely to invest in their land compared 
to those with no formal education which 
contradicts several studies suggesting a 
positive relationship between investment and 
education (see Bizoza et al., 2007; Wynne and 
Lyne, 2003). This is surprising as one will 
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TABLE 4
Investment Equation
Variables Men’s Sample Women’s Sample
Management Rights   -6.889(13.99) -3.765(3.895)
Economic Rights   -9.907(13.61) -12.76*(7.336)
Alienation Rights -6.792(13.38) -2.505(2.379)
Age -0.0137(0.00902) -0.00947(0.00889)
Marital status 0.560*(0.287) -0.219(0.463)
Location 0.0690(0.183) 1.086**(0.427)
Crop 0.0332(0.139) -0.277(0.187)
Educational status -0.247(0.244) -0.694**(0.329)
Economic status 0.522(0.522) -0.329(0.660)
Wealth 0.0281(0.0405) -0.0637(0.0600)
Social network -0.0665(0.136) 0.0929(0.226)
Residual 2 10.95(14.05) 3.429(3.892)
Residual 3 13.56(13.68) 13.31*(7.360)
Residual 4 10.79(13.46) 2.118(2.402)
Constant 6.438(13.15) 4.582(3.181)
Pseudo R2 0.0276 0.0838
Wald χ2 357.10 22.61
P-value 0.0000 0.0669
Observations 772 307
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computation using GHAS data
expect people with higher education to invest 
more in their lands compared to those with no 
formal education. In the case of plots owned 
by men, the educational status did not have 
any significant influence on investment. Plots 
owned by women in urban areas are likely to 
be improved than those own by women in rural 
areas. However, no significant relation was 
found for plots owned by men with regards to 
location.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
 
This study examined the patterns of ownership 
rights as well as the relationship between 
ownership rights and investment from a gender 
perspective in Ghana, using the 2SCML 
estimation technique and data from the GHAS. 
The distribution of ownership rights is not the 
same for women and men landowners. Plots 
owned by men have owners with more rights 
and more of the hierarchically stronger rights 
– economic rights and the rights to sell – than 
plots owned by women. 
Investment in land is generally low and 
tends to occur on plots owned by men. The 
investment made on plots owned by men 
strengthens their owners’ rights to the land. 
However, the same cannot be said about plots 
owned by women as investments in their 
land do not significantly improve their rights 
to the land. Apart from economic rights that 
appear to have a significant negative effect on 
investment of plots owned by women, all the 
other rights did not significantly determine 
investment in plots owned by both men and 
women. 
We recommend that the current land 
administration project in Ghana is 
strengthened as it will enhance the ownership 
(alienation) right of both men and women 
which is quite low. Also, policies should be 
put in place to ensure that men are encouraged 
to make tenure enhancing investments such 
as growing perennial trees, construction of 
farmhouses and irrigation as they tend to 
improve ownership rights of agricultural 
lands. The positive relation between age and 
ownership rights for men suggest that more 
should be done to secure the ownership rights 
of the youth if the government wants them to 
engage in agriculture. The fact that having 
economic right reduces the likelihood of 
women investing in their land is quite puzzling 
and needs further investigation.
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Appendix 1
Ownership Right Categorization
Category Type of Right Description
1 Access and Withdrawal Rights Respondents who reported of not having any of the six rights 
2 Management Right Respondents who have the right to make decisions about the type of crops to grow on the land.
3 Economic Right
Respondents who have management rights and have the right to 
decide what and how much of the produce is sold, decide how 
revenue from the sale of crops is used and to use the land as 
collateral.
4 Alienation Right Respondents who have economic rights in addition to the right to sell the land.
Source: Authors’ based on Classification by Schlager and Ostrom (1992)
Appendix 1
Description of Exogenous Variables for regression
 Variable Measurement 
Age Continuous (in years)
Marital status Dummy: 1 if currently in a union, 0 otherwise
Educational status Dummy: 1 if any formal education, 0 otherwise
Economic status Dummy: 1 if engaged in any economic activity, 0 otherwise
Ownership Dummy: 1 if plot is owned alone, 0 otherwise
 Crop Dummy: 1 if crops grown are annual crops, 0 otherwise
Social network Dummy: 1if belongs to an organization, 0 otherwise
Purchased Dummy: if plot was purchased, 0 otherwise
Gift Dummy: if plot was received as a gift, 0 otherwise
Inheritance Dummy: if plot was inherited, 0 otherwise
Family land Dummy: if plot is family land, 0 otherwise
Source: Authors’ compilation from Ghana Household Asset Survey (GHAS) (2010)
